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20,000 people obtained a living 
from this fishery. But since then, 
catches have fallen to around 
5,000–10,000 tons but prices have 
risen substantially, maintaining the 
incentive to pursue this declining 
species.
Overfishing, in combination with 
habitat loss, pollution, the damming 
of rivers and climate change 
affecting ocean currents, have all 
contributed to the sharp decline 
in eel populations. The stock of 
juvenile eels is estimated to have 
declined by 95–99 per cent since 
1980, Cites say. However, eels have 
a high survival rate, meaning that 
wild populations could recover if 
fewer young eels were caught.
The stock of juvenile eels is 
estimated to have declined 
by 95–99 per cent since 1980, 
Cites say. However, eels have 
a high survival rate, meaning 
that wild populations could 
recover if fewer young eels 
were caught.
The new Cites measures are 
now in place and it is hoped 
that they will help establish a 
sustainable fishery for the European 
eel. All exports now have to be 
accompanied by an export permit, 
which can only be issued after 
scientists in the exporting countries 
have confirmed that the levels of 
trade are not detrimental to the 
survival of the species and that 
the European eel is maintained, 
throughout its range, at a 
population level consistent with its 
role in the ecosystem, Cites say.
Exporting countries will need 
to re-evaluate their eel fishery 
management in order to meet these 
requirements. Importing countries 
will play their part by ensuring that 
all imported eels are accompanied 
by the required Cites export permits.
But, if there is any weakening in 
the ocean currents that bring the 
young eels across the Atlantic, no 
fishing controls are likely to have 
any impact on future populations.
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What is cognition? We favour the 
following definition of cognition: 
“cognition [is] the ability to use 
internal representations of information 
acquired in separate events, and to 
combine these to generate novel 
information and apply it in an adaptive 
manner” (Chittka and Osorio, 2007).
What is ‘colony-level cognition’? 
For some time now it has been 
recognised that colonies of certain 
social organisms, for example 
social insects such as ants or 
honeybees, can legitimately be 
regarded as functionally integrated 
‘superorganisms’. In a social insect 
colony, colony-level cognition can 
be understood as cognition where 
internal representations are within 
the individual insects and their 
interactions with one another, just as 
in a brain the internal representations 
of cognition are in action potentials 
of neurons and their patterns of 
interaction. 
Recently researchers working 
on collective decision-making by 
social insects have noted structural 
parallels between how house-hunting 
colonies are believed to reach 
decisions, and how neural circuits 
in the primate visual cortex achieve 
decision-making during motion-
discrimination tasks (Figure 1). In 
both ant and honeybee colonies, 
and in the neural circuits, different 
populations act as integrators of noisy 
information on alternatives available 
in the environment, and a decision is 
reached when one of these integrator 
populations reaches a threshold. 
In both systems, these integrator 
populations may be arranged such 
that activation of one suppresses 
activation of the others. Finally, in both 
the social insect and neural systems, 
the decision threshold can be varied 
to achieve either quick but inaccurate, 
or accurate but slow decisions. Thus, 
these diverse cognitive systems, while 
appearing to be very different because 
Quick guides of the differences in their physical implementations, actually seem to 
have very similar logical structures. 
This is just one example of what we 
call colony-level cognition.
Is colony-level cognition a new 
idea? The analogy between social 
insect colonies and brains is not 
new, originating most prominently 
with Douglas Hofstadter in his book 
‘Gödel, Escher, Bach’. The phrase 
‘collective intelligence’, championed 
by one of the authors (N.R.F.), has for 
two decades been applied to describe 
the behaviour of social insect colonies 
and other similar biological systems. 
Examples include foraging patterns 
of army ant raids, division of labour 
in honeybee colonies, and so on. 
In these systems, we suggest that 
the collective behaviour observed is 
indeed intelligent, in that it responds 
adaptively to the environment of 
the colony. But there is typically no 
obvious relationship between different 
collectively intelligent behaviours, 
other than a frequent reliance on the 
principles of self-organisation, or 
between these collective behaviours 
and behaviours that individual animals 
might exhibit. Thus, understanding 
these behaviours has to be 
undertaken on a case-by-case basis. 
We propose, however, that colony-
level cognition is distinct from 
collective intelligence, in that it rests 
on parallels between how social 
insect colonies function as cognitive 
systems, and how brains function as 
cognitive systems. We further propose 
that both individual and collective 
cognitive systems can benefit from 
this unified approach. We are not 
alone in arriving at this conclusion, as 
a recent review attests (see ‘Where 
can I find out more?’).
Why is colony-level cognition a 
useful idea? We believe a defining 
feature of the idea of colony-level 
cognition is that analysis and 
understanding of one system can 
provide insights for other systems. 
In other words, different cognitive 
systems, such as brains or social 
insect colonies, may be analysed 
and understood within the same 
framework because of their logical 
structure, regardless of the physical 
details of how this structure is 
implemented. Researchers have 
already taken the idea of analysing 
reaction-time distributions from 
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Social insects such as this Temnothorax albipennis ant (measuring 2 mm and marked with an 
RFID tag for identification) may solve collective decision-making problems using similar rules 
to those used by neural circuits in the primate visual cortex, which are able to solve motion-
 discrimination problems (inset). Both systems are able to vary the compromise between 
speed and accuracy of decision-making. Photo © Nigel R. Franks, random dot-field © Bill 
 Newsome.cognitive systems, which is well 
established in the study of neural 
cognitive systems, and applied it to 
the study of colony-level cognition in 
honeybees. 
More recently we, together with 
colleagues, have taken mathematical 
models of decision-making in neural 
systems, which indicate how such 
systems should be configured to 
implement statistically optimal 
decision-making, and adapted their 
analytic techniques to study models of collective decision-making during 
emigration by ants and honeybees. 
This analysis produces an optimality 
hypothesis with testable predictions 
about how social insects should 
interact during emigration decisions; 
the first such hypothesis for this 
behaviour.
How far does the colony-level 
cognition metaphor stretch? The 
more one considers neural cognitive 
systems and colony-level cognitive systems, the more one realises the 
deep parallels between them, even 
when initially there are apparent 
differences. For example, it seems 
at first that social insect colonies are 
different to neural systems in that the 
former must actively sample uncertain 
information from their environment 
and then decide on it, while in neural 
models information on all alternatives 
is assumed to arrive at equal and 
unvarying rates. It quickly becomes 
clear, however, that in fact neural 
systems are also frequently faced 
with problems of this nature: this is 
the problem of active perception, 
where uncertain information can only 
be gathered from the environment 
by directing attention as appropriate. 
Thus, the study of how this is 
achieved during colony-level cognition 
may inform the study of how neural 
systems manage the same process, 
and vice-versa.
Another apparent difference is 
that in colonies of ants, for example, 
decision making and decision 
implementation appear to be 
conflated, whereas in brains they are 
apparently not. Yet understanding 
of the ants’ problem can lead us to 
look at the neural system in a new 
light, and ask how a speed–accuracy 
trade-off in decision-making can be 
implemented such that consistent 
decision-implementation is realised. 
The question of how neural systems 
implement decision thresholds is 
indeed a current topic. Our basic 
message is that a unifying perspective 
can aid understanding of both 
individual-level and colony-level 
cognition.
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